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STA TE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
J. S. PRESTWICH, M. D. and 
LEATHA GRAFF PRESTWICH, 
his wife, J 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE No. 11263 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The nature of this case amounts to a review of a 
trial in the District Court of Beaver County, Utah, per-
taining tc1 cundemnation of either a parcel of land or 
parc:l'ls ut land in Iron County, State of Utah, West of 
Kanarraville, Utah, in relation to Interstate Highway 
15. This particular land in question is owned by the de-
f Pn<fants, J. S. Prestwich, M. D., and Leatha Graff Prest-
\\ ich. his wife, in various combinations. The two de-
fendants cover all the land in question. This pertains 
tu Project No. 1-15-2(3)43 on the Interstate system in 
Iron County, Utah, and is designated as Parcel Nos. 8:A, 
8:£, 16:A, 18:A, 19:A, 22:A and 24:A. Parcel No. 8:A con-
sists uf 3.94 acres and was the west extension of what 
is c~rillccl in the transcript the "South Field." A tiny 
f·oinu nl' 1 his was on the west side of the freeway. The 
"· t I in:· c1f this particular property generally stopped 
In tile rniddle of the freeway. Parcel 8:E consists of .56 
a< 1 f's. and \\as a drainage easement on the east side 
01 P;q·cc'i 8.A. The v. ater that went through a box on 
R.L cn1l1L' out on 1he west side of the freeway, and 
<'tt 11 ' c·ul 011 ptopP1ty of Glade A. Berry, which resulted 
1 
in separate ownership of the entrances on each side 
the freeway, and made the box unusable as a livesto 
underpass. Both entrances were in meadow land. 1 
The middle field consisted of Parcels 16:A, U ' 
and 19:A. There was land between them on the east si ( 
of the freeway in the Kanarraville area, belonging l 
another party. Parcel 16:A consisted of about 0.20 of ( 
acre, and was simply a tiny point projected onto 1 l 
freeway from the east side. This particular point a i 
was meadow land. Parcel 19:A consisted of 0.28 of I 
acre and also projected onto the freeway from the e' l 
side. This was Soil Bank land at the time of the taki 
and was immediately South of Parcel 18:A, which c 
ered a large portion of the land on both the east R 
west sides of the free\vay. This parcel was in Soil Ba 1 
at the time of the taking, as well as Parcel 19:A, ' J 
they were contiguous parcels. These parcels, 16:A, lf j 
and 19:A were designated in the transcript as them \ 
dle field. On 18:A there were 131 acres remaining t 
the west side of the freeway, and on 19:A there 111 t 
100 acres remaining on the east side of the freeway.' v 
Parcel 16:A there were, according to the charts 11 s 
acres remaining on the east side of the freeway. Ht a 
ever, this was joined above with property East of· 
0 
freeway on 18:A and 19:A. In all, the properties of 1 ~ 
defendants consisted of something in excess of r l 
acres in three separate fields before the taking. Exe ~ 
for 16:A, the areas in the middle field were in the I lJ 
Bank at the time of the taking and previous to go ~J 
into the Soil Bank had been used for growing dry l~ n 
grain. Parcel 22:A was a taking in what is known as F 
north field of 18:11 acres. This was, at the time of v 
taking, in dry land with an undeveloped well appl: 
tion on which there had been a designation for apprr' 
but no approval from the State Engineer's Office 
the West thereof at the time of the taking. The rernc r 
ders were 280 acres on the west side of the trce11 s, 
and 261.21 acres on the east side of the freeway. Tt, [! 
areas were known as the North Field. Parcel 24:A tl 
simply a corner coming in from the East that joine11 c, 
22:A, and was actually a part of contiguous properr 11 
and for practical purposes, ~2:A and 24:A were ca ll 
2 
:ide 111:: i'-Jor1l1 Field in the transcript. Condemnation had 
esto been allowed before, in the Iron County District Court 
d. a considerable period of time ago, and construction was 
11 rompleted at the time of the trial. A motion for change 
st si of vrnue had been allowed, and the matter was tried 
ing befon~ a jury in Beaver County, commencing on the 4th 
) of day uf lVI.arch, 1968, and terminating on the 7th day of 
to 1 March, 1968, all four days being used in the trial. There 
it a is vc1 :; little difference in the thinking of the parties 
of pertaining to the value of the property taken, the great 
ie ec cliff erence being in the question of severance. 
:aki DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
h (1 
st i As indicated above, this case was tried before a 
1 Ba Beaver County jury commencing the 4th day of March, 
A< 1968, and terminating on the 7th day of March, 1968. A 
~ 1 u jury was selected on the 4th day of March, and a view 
.~ m \ra:.: taken of the property. Some evidence was submit-
ing ted to the jury the afternoon of the first day. During 
e w thr; remaining three days, up until the time the matter 
ay.' was submitted to the jury, evidence was offered by both 
, 11 s1cles of the matter. The jury deliberated three hours ~ Hi and ten minutes, and returned at approximately 9:00 
·of. 01·Jock p. m. on the fourth day of the trial The verdict 
f 1 Lhe Jury .returned for the 50.07 acres of the taking, in-o ' . 
if L cludrng the fee as well as easements was $7,850.50; sev-
Ext erence $2G,674.50; total judgment, $34,525. Judgment 
h i of .Just Compensation on the Verdict of the Jury was e, 
-
0 
prepared by the defendants and served. Thereafter, 
> \ pla111tif1 filed a l\1otion of Judgment N.O.V. and Alter-
ry · nrtt<' Molion for Remittitur, Second Alternate Motion for 
·a; f>c'rnit titur, and Alternate Motion for a New Trial, all of 
0
1
; which were denied by the trial court. 
lPP' 
RE:LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Pl«mtiff-appellant seeks to have the Supreme Court 
cerni ri~\ ie"' tlic Trial Court's action in allowing evidence of 
''C€\I ' • • • · t Sh 1 t ct1H.L' to ue submitted to the JUry on the various 
Ti P11 · ('h, and seeks to have the Supreme Court declare 
l:A Hu1 ll1c trial court erred in allowing any severance 
in er 
con:.;idr>n11 ion \1 hatsoever to be submitted to the jury, 
,peri i11.!' 1n11l'11 :1:.; plaintiff-appellant feels that in order for 
~cf. di l 1'11ii 111t-; lo prnve they were entitled to severance dam-
3 
ages, they should have to make proof as an econ01 
unit, and failed to make any proof \Vhatsover as an 
onomic unit. As a result of the failure of the defenda
1 
to make proof in accordance with the laws of the St< 
of Utah, all severance damages should be disallo11 
by the Supreme Court of Utah, and the judgment mo 
fied by the Supreme Court to this extent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The fact situation pertaining to this particular cc 
is very similar to other condemnation actions. Actu 
ly, the defendants owned a large farm and range a. 
to the East of the freeway, and had spent a considt 
ble period of time putting it together. They el 
ed to make proof on same as an economic unit, i11 
much as they maintained a herd of cattle on a yt 
around basis. The North ~ie~9 was an extension to 
West of these ~~erties, .sut\vas ~ contiguous tht 
to. The same is~~vrlie \Vith the Middle Field in both ik 
There were other owners between the South Field a 
the other properties. The South Field was separa 
from t!-~e other properties by approximately one m 
'i he testimony of the defendant and both valuation 11 
nesses was that this was a year-around operation, z 
that it amounted to an economic unit. The total pn 
erty owned by the defendants in the area was sor 
thing in excess of 1100 acres, part of which was u 
gated, and part of which was not. In addition, prior 
the taking, an application for a water well had bt 
pending for several years in the area of the North Fir 
well to the West of the freeway. In August befor( 
ta~dng, this was designated for approval. However,· 
State Engineer's office did not approve this applical 
for drilling until substantially after the taking. T 
well had been drilled after the taking, and had not t· 
put to beneficial use. It hacl been tested on approxirnc 
ly 20 acres, up to and including the irrigation sea~ 
of 1967. The question of an economic unit was 1·0:· 
all through the transcript, and Dr. Prestwich testi; 
that approximately half of his income came off fi 
this property, and the remainder from a medical pl 
tice. Over objection the court allowed proof of ant 
nomic unit. Also over objection the court allowed rr 
4 
tu he made on the North Field on the basis of an irri-
gation potential rather than a speculation item. The pri-
rnary q ue:stion in all of this is whether or not these de-
tendants should be allowed severance under cases that 
lrnvc previously been decided by the Supreme Court of 
Utah. There had been the usual service of summons 
and order of occupation. There is no question as to the 
date of taking, or anything of that nature. Summons 
\\·t;.s served on 13 December, 1963, and the Order of Oc-
cupation \Vas 19 December, 1963. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING SEV-
ERANCE DAMAGES TO BE DISCUSSED BECAUSE 
DEFENDANTS FAILED TO MEET BURDEN OF 
PROVING THEY WERE ENTITLED TO THAT 
KIND OF DAMAGE. 
Time after time, objections were made, as the tran-
script shows, to any severance damage consideration 
whatsoever, and the court allowed these objections to 
run to any testimony concerning severance damages. 
, The defendants kept referring to the case of State of 
ULah by and through its Road Commission vs Gordon 
1 G. Howes, ct al., which at that time was in the green 
sheets, and is now found in 20 Utah 2d 246, and at 436 
I P.2d 803, as authority that they could go ahead without 
making any showing whatsoever that there was any 
, question of severance damages, or that they were en-
titled to this kind of damage. This is not what the Howes 
ca~;c states. The Howes case states specifically: 
"In a condemnation action, before a landowner may 
introduce evidence relating to the amount of sever-
a1we damage he must first meet the burden of prov-
i11g that he is entitled to that kind of damage." 
i' In no place did the defendants make any offer whatso-
'' t ,, 01 any proof to show that they were entitled to 
1 
Sl'\N<:111cc d.a1nage, but simply went into it over the ob-
1 Jf'CL1on of 1 he plaintiff. In addition, the testimony of 
r Uw drtl'lHlants showed that there was additional land 
r <ii :1ilahk in 1 he area that could be purchased for a les-
5 
ser price than they were asking for, in any respect, a 
that would more than mitigate all severance damai 
As a matter of fact, there was actually sold in the ear 
part of 1964, 160 acres of land contiguous to the Nor 
Field, which, if water was available from the irrigat 
well, could have been irrigated out of the irrigat1 
well that is discussed at length in this matter. Not r 
ly did the defendants fail to show any basis for se1, 
ance damages, but they showed that they had m1 
no effort whatsoever to purchase any land to take 1 
place of the property being injured, and they also sho 
ed that land was available, even though they testif1 
otherwise. 
One has but to examine the transcript to some fr 
ited extent to find that the defendants made no atterr 
whatsoever to buy land to take the place of the la 
being taken or injured. This was brought out in di!\ 
testimony of Dr. Prestwich by his counsel, and may 
found at Page 104 of the transcript, beginning at L 
1 and running to Liine 23. However, this was not t 
co.::;c, a:1d was proven false by the defendant's own w 
ness. This is the land that in every respect was co: 
parable to the North and Middle Fields of the defer 
ants. This was brought out by direct examination 
Mr. Barron, one of the defendants' appraisers, and co 
menced on Page 229 of the transcript, at Line 10. ~ 
continued on for several pages, showing where Dr. Gri 
bought 80 acres from one woman and 80 acres from 
other woman, and that this property was between i 
Graff's property and the defendants' and was conu, 
ous to the north side thereof, and that it was downr 
from the well that defendant testified about, and co~ 
easily have been irrigated, although it might have nei 
ed some leveling. This is contiguous to land which 11 
testified, page 229, previously, as being depreciateo 
value, from Line 3 to Line 9. This property was actua 
sold in May or June of 1964, and was two sales oi 
acres each. The property was all West of the tree11 ' 
Although the witness talked some concerning being a 
to reach the property, it certainly was available to· 
defendants' land, as it had a common fence, exte110 
160 rods. 'fhis land wa~.; purchased at $50.00 an acre 
though some of the subject land adjacent to it \I as 
6 
pt aised ;1 l $60.00 an acre. The date of sale is shown on 
J>ctge ll.~J. at Lines 27 and 28 of the transcript. The ac-
reage is shown on Page 229, Line 30, and Page 230, Line 
l; bt>ing adjacent to the defendants' property is shown 
on Page 230 from Line 17 to Line 22. Similarity of the 
properties is shown on Page 231, Line 7 to Line 10. The 
productivity of the property is shown on Page 231, Line 
HS to Page 232, Line 3. It was amazing to find the de-
fendants' witness testifying that this was better land 
than the middle field, ale10ugh it had sold a good deal 
lower than the appraisal on the middle field of the de-
fendan ls. This can be found beginning on Page 236 of 
the transcript at Line 16, and running to Page 237 of 
the transcript, Line 1. It is also amazing to find that all 
of the above information concerning this 160 acres of 
ground, except the last item, concerning its similarity to 
the middle field, was developed from direct examina-
tion. 
Under these conditions, with better land being 
arnilal.Jle adjacent to the defendants' property, at a 
lesser price, then certainly the case of State of Utah, 
by and through its Road Commission vs Gordon G. 
Howes, et al. cited at 436 P2d 803 and 20 Utah 2d 246, 
cu;:.cs into effect wherein, as above quoted, it is neces-
sar:i , lJefore a landowner may introduce evidence re-
lating lo the amount of severance damage, he must first 
meet the ourden of proving that he is entitled to that 
kind of damage. Actually, the sum total of Mr. Barron's 
testimony, substantiated in later parts of the transcript 
U) Mr. Palmer, another of the defendants' witnesses, 
very defmitely sets aside the defendants' testimony that 
there was no other land available. All that happened 
11 as, his brother-in-law outran him to it. Especially is 
llllS 1 l'UE' when one considers Mr. Barron's testimony 
lhei l it 1, as better land than the middle field, as good 
ldrnl a::; the north field, adjacent to the north field, ad-
J;i,·,·n1 :o the well that was later drilled on the north 
fiPJ 1l. ;11HI was actually being sold within four months 
'J; t 11, 1 i1m· of taking for considerably less money thaµ 
•
1n1 of dl'fc>ndants' witnesses appraised either the north 
tiPlll rir t lw middle field at. Thus it is shown that there 
\·,~'" land available, and that the defendants made no 
11111 11 l111\<1i·d lJuying it whatsoever. Under these condi-
7 
tions, the defendants failed in their burden establish1 
by the case of State of Utah vs Howes, to show that th' 
are entitled to that kind of damage. \Vhen there i~, lar 
available, and no effort is made to purchase it, the V[ 
ious cases cited by the plaintiff at the Lime of trial cor 
into bearing on this matter. This brings into effect 
long line of cases that show that where there is Ja1 
available, the defendant has a duty to attempt top~ 
chase same to mitigate damages: Provo River Wal 
Users' Association v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P. 
777; State Road Commission vs Cooperative Securr 
Corporation, 122 Utah 134, '.247 P. 2d 269, and State 
Utah vs Cooperative Security Corporation, 1 U. 2d 1; 
264 P. 2d 281. 
The record contains many objections to severa111 
on the basis that there had been no foundation laid r 
same, and the record is replete with continuing objt 
tions \Vhich were allowed to continue to all severn 
testimony in the case. This starts at Page 77, Line 
to Line 21. On Line 26 counsel represents that they a 
going to talk about the various fields, and then tur 
around and talks about economic units. The same 
true of circuity of travel. Again, this starts on Page 1 
at Line 26 and runs to Page 196, Line 9. There is a c0 
tinuing objection to all this line of questioning on Pai 
196, Line 25 and 26. The part containing the objectil 
is found on Page 82, Line 17 to Line 22. There is qw· 
a discussion on the point beginning at Page 344, at Li 
7, and running to Page 346, Line 29. The Judge rult 
on Page 346, commencing at Line 22, "I don't object 
your raising your point, but on the other hand, I'll ta 
it to be that you object to the entire line, and the reC(' 
may show your objection to any severance damai 
going to the entire proposition without pursuing it al 
further. I will, on the other hand, think about it ll: 
way through lunch."' 
Under these circumstances, there is no quesh 
that there is a continuing objection to any severat 
damage in the entire case. This follows to the tcstirnr 
that land was available for purchase at $50.00 an ac: 
This may be found in the direct examination of the r 
fendants' witness, Barron, on Page :278, commencing 
Line 12, and running to Page 282, at Linc 13. Ull' 
8 
tliesr cu11dit ions, there can be no question that the de-
lendanL~~ did not comply with the case of the State of 
Utal1 by and through its Road Commission vs. Howes, 
and did not meet the burden of proving that they were 
entitled to severance damage, but on the contrary 
pro\'ed Urnt there was other land available that could 
!ia, c been bought at a cheaper price; that it was as 
guod vr lwtte1· land than either the north field or the 
1nicltlle field, and under these conditions, the trial court 
erred in allowing any di 'CUssion of severance whatso-
ever. One must interpret both the State of Utah by and 
fornugh its Road Commission vs. Howes together with 
tne Cooperative Security Corporation cases cited above. 
Point II 
HAVING ELECTED TO PUT ON PROOF OF ECO-
NOMIC UNIT, DEFENDANTS ENTIRELY FAILED 
TO SHO\N BEFORE AND AFTER VALUE OF ECO-
NOMIC UNIT, AND AS A RESULT FAILED TO 
PUT ON ANY PROOF OF SEVERANCE DAMAGE. 
In this connection, this is a shining example of hav-
ing yuur cake and eating it too. The defendant many 
times discussed the economic unit over objection, and 
~Lt the same time attempted to keep from using the 
\\ urci.s "ecu110mic unit." However, one must take the 
ti:>~Lirnuny in its total light, and under these circum-
;t r:i.nces, one can only come to the conclusion that the 
rnattcr was put on as an economic unit by the defend-
ant, over objection, although there was much discussion 
ui.· ·,;cpa: dle fields. The testimony of all defendant wit-
ni·:,:-:c; ;1 s to the actual use of the fields and how they 
rotated the cattle, and how these fields supplemented 
L'<.cl1 other. and the land to the East, and things of this 
llc•tLn'. ,·an only come to the conclusion that it was the 
'•l't--i1t1<i·1 of tlie defendant to discuss this matter as an 
· ;:,1u1iu1· Lrnit, and that the only reason the words were 
11u1 '· \:;cd 1' as Lile defendant desired not to show the 
' 
li.i[;i; '<ULL 01 1 he property. It can be seen in cross-ex-
1 1lii1ti1011 on ]'age 107, from Line 10 through Line 28, 
1 n:~1 tl11· ( 0111·1 had already ruled that this was an eco-
11111nic unit in I he Court's mind. Also, the nature of the 
' 1·.1 1 , 11011 slww~; that counsel did not desire the jury to 
! 1111 11 1\h<1t prnportion of the defendants' income came 
9 
from this property. While this item may not be co: 
trolling as an economic unit, certainly, it is one of 1: 
1 
factors that does have some bearing on this. Counse 1 
objection to the effect that income had nothing to l 
1 
with fair market value, shows that counsel was co 
1 
cerned as to the economic unit at that time also. An e· , 
cellent description of an economic unit begins on Pai 
78 at Line 7, where counsel was asked how these fiel· , 
tied into the total farm operation, and the resultil ; 
answers, and runs to Page 81 on Line 26. Certaini. , 
there was no purpose in this discussion except · 
show an economic unit. Also, on Page 82 there is anai 
mission between Line 6 and Line 11 that, while coum 
is not ready on this preliminary basis to go into e 1 
economic unit, he did intend to later on in the trial. Tf. 1 
again was objected to with the continuing objection: 1 
Page 82, Line 20 to Line 22. Also, in counsel's introdu 
tory statements, which were even before an openr 
statement, and were simply attempting to illustrate 
the jury what they were going to look for before thi < 
went to the view, there is no question but that he is d 
cussing the item as an economic unit. This starts·· 
Page 4 at Line 3, and continues to Page 5 at Line 2. ( 
Page 4, beginning with Line 29, is the following, "TI 
total unit consisted of three fields, generally refen' 
to as the north, the middle, and the south fields. Dv c 
tile Court want me to further elaborate?" 
Also, in discussion the damage, counsel referred ' 
the damage as the damage to the whole property. Tt 
may be found beginning at Page 102 on the transcrti c 
Line 30, and through Line 7 on Page 103, which ends 
the statement, "the whole property." This is objeclt 1 
to in the next two lines. 
Pertaining to Mr. Barron's testimony, there is· 
question that he considered the matter to be one un 
Le called it "the farm, . . . located in three fields." Tt L 
is shown at Page 183, Lnie 4, continuing through Lr 
19. Also, the defendant, in describing his operation 
a typical operation, used this on the basis of an econon 
unit. This begins at Page 169, at Line 8 in the transcr!' 
and ends at Line 6, at Page 170. 
Mr. Barron was attempting to define the \alur r 
entire farm before and after the taking, as shown 
10 
co p~1gc· El::>. Li11es 10 to 24, under direct examination. The 
ft: court so unde1·stood his answer that Mr. Barron apprais-
1se t'U tllis as a total operating unit. This was a beef cow 
.o ( unit This \Vas developed by direct examination, begin-
co ning at Page 195, Line 30, running to Page 197, Line 3. 
n e· This procedure was objected to in the center of this tes-
Pai timony on continuing objection, on Page 196, Line 25, 
'.ielr 11·hich the court allowed as a continuing objection to 
1ltir ail testimony. Mr. Barron continued his testimony as 
lini. an operating unit, Page !97, from Line 22 of the tran-
lt script, and running on to Page 200 at Line 29. - This, 
ri a'. althor:gh there was a continuing objection to this en-
uns tire line of testimony. There is no question that the 
l r court felt the testimony was as an operating unit, anq 
Tr. was allowing it in as such, over objection. The contin-
in '· umg objection to this entire line of testimony is on Page 
)du 196 of the Transcript at Line 25. 
~rn It is quite revealing that Marcellus Palmer, with 
te all his alleged completeness, also considered this an 
th1 economic unit, and presented evidence on this basis, as 
s d a witness of the defendant, under direct examination 
ts by defendants' attorney. This can be seen at Page 339, 
l. l Line 1, and continuing to Page 340, Line 20. Thereafter, 
"TI there is the usual objection, which was overruled. On 
m Page ;;41, the objection was extended to the entire line of 
D~ questioning that had to do with severance. There af-
ter, it was overruled. Thereafter, Mr. Palmer, on Page 
~d 341. under the prompting of defendant's attorney, con-
Tr Unued with showing an economic unit, at Line 12 of 
cri; of Page .141, and continuing on to Page 343 at Line 25. 
ls· Thereafter was the argument of counsel and the court's 
~cit ruling referred to above in which the court allowed the 
continuing objection to all severance testimony, includ-
15 · ing testimony to separate parcels and testimony as to 
u1: an economic unit, as shown in the transcript on Page 
Tt J4Li. If there was any question as to whether or not Mr. 
u P:tit: 11.r considered this an ecoaomic unit, in his testi-
Jn molly uf dl'Valuation he considered property a mile 
ort ai.;iv to the E;ast of the freeway. This can be found on 
:ri' I'.tge :111, ;1 t Line 5, in response to defendants' counsel's 
questions, and the answer thereafter, ending at Line 11. 
1e lh 11 i11 tlic cross-examination on Page 404, Line 30, the 
qiie.;11011 \\ tts asked Mr. Palmer, "Now, you've consid-
11 
ered this Prestwich situation entirely as an econon 
unit, haven't you?" 
On Page 405, at Line 2, the answer is, "Yes, I Ci 
sidered it to be an economic unit." 
Thereafter followed quite a discussion concern
1 
the use of the property as an economic unit, in wh1 
. counsel objected to questions attempting to find 0 
what family lived on the property and depended on 1: 
so-called economic unit. There is no question the co1 
considered the testimony to be that of an economic un 
This can be found in the pronouncements of the cm 
on Page 406, beginning at Line 10, to Line 21. Aga: 
Mr. Palmer, on Page 407, Line 17, indicated that "t 
size and the operation totally is a balanced unit." T 
transcript is completely full of all this type of testimo: 
from all of the witnesses, including one of the defer 
ants and both witnesses as to valuation. Also, there 
no question that Mr. Palmer had previous knowlea, 
of the sales above ref erred to, in which Dr. Graff bou5 , 
160 acres from two ladies, being 80 acres apiece, as 
had copies of the deeds. This is shown on Page 411, Ll 
14, in the transcript, continuing to Page 412, Line. 
Again, there has been a failure of the duty of the defer, 
ants, not only in Point I above where they failed to mr 
the burden of proving that they are entitled to sen 1 
ance damage, but in this point there is no question tt 1 
the entire defendant's case was built upon an econorr 
u11it. At no place is there any testimony concerning l 
value of the economic unit before the taking, and l 
value of the economic unit after the taking. Um 1 
these conditions, it is impossible under the laws of 1 
State of Utah to condone an award of the several. 
damages, and the court erred in allowing the severa:' 
question to go to the jury. Plaintiff's requested instn 
tion on this severance jtem (Plaintiff's Requested: 
struction No.1)'>-.~a§t ~J. given, and correctly stated 1 
law under these circumstances. The court did not gi· 
a satisfactory instruG.}ion in }/lace of plaintiff's requesl. I 
instruction No. 1);rh/f ~ohect determination of da. 
ages in an item of unit operation is a before and a~ 
value of the entire unit. This is shown in the Weber!· 
sin Water Conservancy District vs. Nelson case in 11 LI ' 
2d 253, 358 P.2d 81. This is also found in Salt Lake l': 
12 
norr 1, Co1 l<J11\\0od Sanitary District vs. Toone; 11 Utah 2d 
:·:,::, :\.-1;- P.:2rl cl8G; State of Idaho vs. Dunclick, 286 P.2d 
I c 11L.'., :.)tall' vs. Peterson, 12 U.2d 317, 366 P.2d 76. 
Point III 
Wh! THE JURY, THE DEFENDANTS, AND DEFEND-
d, ANTS' APPRAISERS WERE ALLOWED TO SPEC-
n I: ULA TE ON VALUE OF UNDEVELOPED IRRIGA-
cor TlON WATER. 
: Ufl Dt>fendants' Exhibit _i3 was an application to ap-
COL propriate \Vater. Defendants' Exhibit No. 23 was the ~gm mcmm andum decision of the State Engineer wherein 
;, ·~ the application was approved. This approval did not 
take place until after the taking. A comparison of the 
.mo: dates on Exhibit 23 and the date of the taking answers 
~fei. this question in full. However, there was a great deal 
ere of speculation as to the irrigation value of water that 
1·Jeo, might !Jc developed out of this water application. These 
oui speculative items over objections may be found at Page 
as: :::S8. Line 28 in the transcript, running from there to 
'Li Page '.2G3 at Line 8, in which it is shown that although 
1e · this \\'as a guess, the court allowed the matter to go to 
~fer, the jury ove1· objection. This allowed the jury to specu-
rnr late un the value of water out of an application that had 
seir 1101 been approved as of the time of the taking. Mr. Bar-
1 ti ro:1 '.;pl:'culated on this at Page 206, Lines 10 through 
norr 18. - This, although Mr. Barron had never seen Exhibit 
1g i: ~0. or realized that the matter was in existence, and was 
d t 
••
1 a\\ zu·e of it at the time he made his appraisal. This 
0m i< sho\1 n on Page ::'.44, Line 8, through Line 30. Under 
Jf ! tlwse < onditions, there can be no question that Mr. Bar-
raJ. 1111 1 speculatl'd on this matter. He was not even aware 
rar I t iat at the time of the taking, the application had not 
st1
1 
been approved, and that the approval was secured after 
id : ti 
ir- lc1king. This was his mental condition at the time 
d I: l 
l( mad;· llis appraisal. Mr. Palmer also speculated on 
·. g1 t l . •1 L~ m;it kl', as can be found on Page 412, Line 24, to 
ies! I ·1 .e 4L~, Line 6. 
M Under these conditions, there is no question that 
al: ~lie dd,·nrlant .T. s. Prestwich, M. D. speculated on this 
·r r ,. 
'cilt.:l i1l'lil lJdm·l' the jury, and both the defendants' 
LI '1P/J 1'"i ;cl'·;, Mr. Barron and Mr. Marcellus Palmer also 
lllCi!L1 I l·d un this item, although it was a matter of 
13 
common knmvledge that even approved water app]i, di 
tions are of little value until they have been drilled, a in 
it is also quite apparent that in this area there was c1 ui 
siderable turmoil concerning whether or not the aPr JL 
cations should be even approved for drilling. Uni 
L .c-se conditions, there is no question that the jury'" 
allowed to speculate on this water item. 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion that one must come to is tha! 
this particular matter. in addition to the jury being 
lowed to speculate on the value of a water applical 
for underground water rig!1ts, the law was not c0 
plied with, and the defendants entirely failed to m' 
their burden of proving that they were entitled to' 
severance damage whatsoever, and that there was at 
land available, and the defendant made no effor! 
purchase same whatsoever. It was actually sold a I 
weeks niter the taking to Dr. Prestwich's brother 
law for $50.00 pe1· acre, which was considerably i' 
than any of the land involved in the taking, or i 
q;..<estions in connection therewith, and by Mr. Barro 
t2stbwny, it was comparable to the north field ' 
betLer land than the middle field, and was where, if· 
water amounted to anything in the defendants' \\el:. 
could have been irrigated by the well proposed in· 
fendants' application that was pending at the time 
tile taking. Also, under these conditions, one can 01 
conclude that the defendants entirely failed in their b1 
den of proving that they were entitled to severar: 
damage, and under such conditions, severance dan, 
should be disallowed. 
Also, under Point II, it is quite apparent that 1 
defendants elected to proceed on the basis of an ccont 
ic unit, but entirely failed to show any acceptable' 
ues of the economic unit either before or after the 1 
ing, and under these conditions, severance should 
disallowed. 
As set forth herein, not only was the jury all01' 
· ·J speculate on the value of a water application, 1 
the defendants failed to make any acceptable prool 
severance damage, and the plaintiff hereby requr 
that all severance damage be deleted because ot · 
14 
iii ddt·ndants' failure to make proof on same, and that the 
Ii 111 r11 ter be remanded back to the District Court with 
c1 urdc1 s to delete all severance damage, and to allow 
1p1 ;udgment for the taking only. 
n1 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
ii Atto:ney General 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
ii 
~'( Special Assistant Attorney General 
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